Long-Run Earnings Mobility among Low-Income Individuals by Mullins, Brett et al.
Journal of Economics and Public Finance  
ISSN 2377-1038 (Print) ISSN 2377-1046 (Online) 
Vol. 2, No. 1, 2016 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jepf 
154 
 
Long-Run Earnings Mobility among Low-Income Individuals 
Brett Mullins
1
, Mark Rider
2
, David L. Sjoquist
2
 & Sally Wallace
2,3*
 
1
 Department of Mathematics, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio 
2
 Department of Economics, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia 
3
 The African Tax Institute, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa 
*
 Sally Wallace, E-mail: swallace@gsu.edu
 
 
Abstract 
We construct earnings mobility matrices for low-income individuals over 6-year and 13-year periods. 
Our sample of low-income individuals is drawn from the population of SNAP recipients in Georgia. 
Using Georgia administrative records, we identify SNAP participants in 2000 and their earnings for 
each year through 2013 using matched employment security records. We find that a substantial 
percentage of these individuals have zero earnings in both the initial and ending years. We find that 
there is a heavier concentration of males, whites, and disabled individuals with zero earnings in the 
initial and ending years than in the overall SNAP sample. This contradicts some of the 
characterizations of SNAP recipients in the popular press which often characterizes those stuck in 
poverty as single black mothers. In fact, the disabled represent the vast majority of those stuck in the no 
earnings category. Another interesting finding is that single mothers with zero earnings in 2000 have a 
greater probability, in some cases a much greater probability, of escaping the zero earnings category 
than the general population of SNAP recipients. We also find that individuals with positive earnings in 
the initial year experience substantial earnings mobility.  
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1. Introduction 
There is a great deal of interest in recent trends in income inequality in the United States. A closely 
related issue is income mobility; that is the degree to which there are changes in the rank of households 
in the income distribution. Several recent papers measure income mobility in the general U.S. 
population; examples include Carroll, Joulfaian and Rider (2006), Auten and Gee (2009), Bradbury and 
Katz (2009), and Auten, Gee and Turner (2013). Studies of income mobility generally use individual 
income tax return data from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, and thus consider households that file 
an income tax return. Therefore, individuals who do not file a federal individual income tax return, 
which is disproportionately compromised of low-income individuals, are not captured in such studies. 
To the best of our knowledge, no one has focused exclusively on the income mobility of low-income 
individuals or, to be more precise, on the income mobility of individuals with a low-income episode 
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(Note 1). This is an unfortunate gap in the literature given the efforts to improve the long-run earnings 
mobility of low-income individuals through various programs including many publically funded 
income-support programs.  
In this paper we examine the long-run earnings mobility of low-income individuals in Georgia. We 
identify low-income individuals by their participation in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP). As described in detail in the next section, we assemble administrative records for 
SNAP beneficiaries in Georgia and match them with Employment Security (ES202) records on wages, 
covering the period from January 2000 through December 2013 (Note 2). We believe we are the first to 
explore income transitions of program participants using population-based data. Many of the program 
participants in our sample may not file federal income tax returns because they have no taxable income 
to report and do not qualify for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Therefore, they would be 
missing from the existing studies based on federal personal income tax return data. 
Briefly, we make a number of interesting and surprising findings. We find that a substantial percentage 
of SNAP recipients appear to be stuck or trapped with no earnings in the initial and terminal years of 
our observation period. We find that there is a heavier concentration of males, whites and disabled 
individuals with zero earnings in the initial and terminal years of the observation period than in the 
overall SNAP sample. This contradicts some of the characterizations of SNAP recipients in the popular 
media which often characterizes those stuck in poverty as single black mothers. In fact, the disabled 
represent the vast majority of those stuck in the no earnings category. Another interesting finding is that 
single mothers with zero earnings in 2000 have a greater probability, in some cases a much greater 
probability, of escaping the zero earnings category than the general population of SNAP recipients. We 
also find that individuals with positive earnings in the initial year experience substantial earnings 
mobility.  
This study makes three contributions to the literature on earnings mobility. First, we examine the 
earnings mobility of low-earning individuals. Second, we use administrative data rather than survey data. 
The advantage of using administrative data is that they are less prone to reporting errors than survey data 
like the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) or the Supplemental Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP). Third, we examine earnings mobility over a relatively long period of time. The long 
period allows us to explore how the degree of earnings mobility varies over time and allows us to account 
for a broader set of behaviors than previous studies of the effects of program participation, which 
generally focus on measuring the effects of social programs on women’s short-run labor supply 
decisions. 
A limitation of this research is that we have data for only one state. Although the data are not nationally 
representative, Georgia is a large state and in many ways is representative of an average or typical U.S. 
state. For example, in 2008 Georgia’s median household income ranked 23rd and the percent of the 
population with a BA degree or more and the percent that are homeowners are essentially the same as 
the national average. Given the nature of this study, we believe that the advantages of administrative 
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data are worth the tradeoffs in terms of limited geographic coverage. An additional limitation of the 
data is that we cannot include low-income individuals who do not participate in SNAP. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the data used in 
this study and discuss trends in program participation. In the third section, we construct earnings 
transition matrices for program beneficiaries to measure the effect of program participation on earnings 
mobility. A summary section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data 
We utilize two datasets—administrative records for SNAP and for employment security. We use 
monthly records from the Georgia Department of Human Services (GDHS) for the period covering 
January 2000 through December 2013 (168 months), for participants in the SNAP program. 
To study long-run earnings mobility among program participants, we need a measure of earnings over 
the entire observation period of this study. When an individual is no longer enrolled in SNAP, we can 
no longer rely on SNAP records to observe earnings. Therefore, we use administrative records on 
employment and wages from the Georgia Department of Labor (GDOL) to measure annual earnings for 
all years. These data come from Form ES202, which is filed by employers as required for the 
administration of the unemployment insurance program and consist of quarterly employment and wage 
reports for each employee of a firm. The form includes the wages paid by the firm to that employee 
during a given quarter and a unique identifier for each employee, which permits us to match these data 
to the SNAP records (Note 3). If an individual has multiple employers in a given period, we construct 
their total wage and salary income by quarter by identifying each firm for which the individual has 
reported earnings. This permits us to construct a measure of annual earnings for each individual in the 
sample by summing over the quarterly reports of wage and salary income for every employer of that 
individual during a given year. 
We create our sample by selecting all individuals who are enrolled in SNAP during any month in 2000, 
and then determine annual earnings for years 2000, 2006 and 2013. Since we are interested in long-run 
earnings mobility of program participants, we want to consider individuals who would potentially be in 
the labor force during the entire period. We therefore exclude seniors and children from the sample. 
More specifically, we exclude individuals who would be at least sixty-five years old at any point during 
the sample period, i.e., individuals that are older than 51 in January 2000. The exclusion of seniors 
decreases the SNAP sample by 10.8 percent. For our purposes, an individual is designated a minor and 
excluded from the sample if the enrollee is less than eighteen years of age in January 2000. The 
exclusion of minors decreases the SNAP sample by 52.0 percent. 
There are some disadvantages to using ES202 data to measure earnings mobility. First, we cannot 
observe out-of-state earnings nor can we observe non-wage income from any source (in-state or 
out-of-state). Furthermore, we cannot observe wages from the informal sector; that is, wages paid by an 
employer that for whatever reason does not file Form ES202 or fails to report or misreports the 
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earnings of some or all of its employees. Finally, self-employed individuals are not required to file 
Form ES202; therefore, we cannot account for self-employment income. 
In addition to examining the effect of program participation on long-run earnings mobility, we also 
examine the relationship between the duration of program participation and long-run earnings mobility. 
Therefore, we proceed below by briefly reviewing the evidence on the duration of program 
participation (Note 4). Figure 1 reports the number of individuals in our sample that have been 
continuously enrolled in SNAP for a given number of months. For example, the height of the top line 
(or the solid line) in Figure 1 reflects the number of individuals in a given month that have been 
enrolled for at least the previous 11 months, that is, for a least one year. Since we do not observe 
participation before January 2000, we cannot determine the length of enrollment for those who enrolled 
prior to January 2000; therefore, the top line starts on December 2000. For this reason, the length of 
enrollment should be viewed as a minimum period; some of the participants may have been enrolled 
for longer periods. Similarly, the other lines in Figure 1 represent longer minimum enrollment durations 
thus the lines begin on more recent dates. The five lines reflect continuous (uninterrupted) durations of 
at least 1 year (12 months) to at least 7 years (84 months). The general upward trend in all of these lines 
is in large part a function of general population growth in Georgia. However, there is no mistaking the 
steep increase in durations of one to four years that comes about during and after the Great Recession 
of 2007-2009. This pattern began to turn around in late 2012 and early 2013. The interaction between 
earlier (milder) recessions and SNAP were much less pronounced. 
 
 
Figure 1. Consecutive Total SNAP Enrollment by Year 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note. Enrollment is the number of individuals. 
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Overall, the duration for SNAP participants is long. In December 2008, 57.9 percent of enrollees were 
on SNAP for at least 12 months; whereas, in December 2013, 47.1 percent were enrolled for at least 12 
months. There is also an increase in the number of participants for all SNAP durations over the sample 
period. For example, the proportion of total SNAP enrollees on the program for at least 3 years 
increases from 20.6 percent to 23.5 percent over this period.  
 
3. Earnings Mobility 
We now turn to our central question: what is the long-run earnings mobility among low-earnings 
individuals? Table 1 and Table 2 are earnings transition matrices. To construct an earnings transition 
matrix, we partition the sample into six earnings categories (a $0 category and then quintiles) for year 
2000 and for the ending year, either 2006 or 2013 (Note 5). To investigate the influence of time on 
earnings mobility, we observe the beginning and ending earnings of the sample for two time periods: 
2000 to 2006 and 2000 to 2013. 
More specifically, the rows in the tables correspond to the six earnings categories in year 2000, and the 
columns correspond to the six earnings categories in year 2006 or year 2013, where the earnings are 
inflation adjusted using the CPI-U in 2000 is equal to 1.00. Since a large proportion of the sample 
reports no earnings in either year (according to the ES202 data), we create a category in both years for 
those with no earnings. This category is labeled $0 in the tables. We partition the remaining 
observations, that is, those individuals with nonzero earnings in both years, into quintiles. Each quintile 
has an equal number of individuals; these quintiles are labelled Q1 through Q5. The dollar amounts 
reported in the border rows and columns are the upper earnings bounds for the corresponding earnings 
category. For the reader’s convenience, the five quintiles with nonzero earnings are identified with a 
thick border in each table. For ease of reference, we call this matrix the “nonzero-earnings” submatrix.  
Our interest is in the stationarity of earnings over time rather than the growth in earnings; thus, we are 
interested in the changes in the rank of individuals by their earnings. The earnings transition matrices 
are constructed so that when someone moves to a higher (lower) earnings quintile other than from the 
$0 category, then someone else must move to a lower (higher) earnings quintile.  
Table 1 and Table 2 are transition matrices for the two time periods, respectively, for the sample of 
327,913 individuals. The top figure in each cell in Table 1 is the number of individuals in the respective 
quantile. For example, there are 88,895 individuals who report zero earnings in both years. The figure 
in brackets in each cell is the number of individuals as a percentage of the row sum. In other words, 79 
percent of the 112,679 individuals in the $0 category in year 2000 are still in the $0 category in 2006. 
Moving rightwards along the row labelled $0 in Table 1, we see that approximately 7 percent of those 
without any earnings in 2000 experience sufficient earnings growth by 2006 to place them in the first 
(nonzero) quintile in 2006. This quintile corresponds to the column labeled Q1 in Table 1. 
Approximately, 3 percent of the individuals with no earnings in year 2000 experience sufficient 
earnings in 2006 to be in the fifth nonzero quintile (Q5) in 2006. By summing the percentages in the 
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row labelled $0 and the columns labelled Q1 through Q5, we see that approximately 21 percent of 
those with no earnings in 2000 experience sufficient earnings growth to escape the $0 category by 2006. 
This suggests that there is remarkably little earnings mobility among those individuals who are enrolled 
in SNAP in 2000 and begin in the $0 earnings category in 2000. 
 
Table 1. Earnings Mobility between January 2000 and December 2006 
Quintile 
(threshold) 
$0 
Q1:  
$2,548 
Q2:  
$7,223 
Q3:  
$12,239 
Q4:  
$18,576 
Q5:  
$42,344 
Row  
Sums 
$0  
88,895 7,715 5,689 4,315 3,172 2,893 112,679 
[79] [7] [5] [4] [3] [3] [100] 
Q1:  
$1,480 
22,945 7,291 5,095 3,498 2,414 1,803 43,046 
[53] [17] [12] [8] [6] [4] [100] 
Q2:  
$4,206 
17,930 6,688 6,571 5,075 3,909 2,874 43,047 
[42] [16] [15] [12] [9] [7] [100] 
Q3:  
$7,915 
14,371 5,187 6,704 6,811 5,712 4,262 43,047 
[33] [12] [16] [16] [13] [10] [100] 
Q4:  
$12,681 
10,952 3,586 5,405 8,219 8,574 6,311 43,047 
[25] [8] [13] [19] [20] [15] [100] 
Q5:  
$28,984 
12,681 2,215 3,219 4,764 8,902 14,539 43,047 
[22] [5] [7] [11] [21] [34] [100] 
Column 
Sums 
164,501 32,682 32,682 32,682 32,683 32,682 327,913 
[50] [10] [10] [10] [10] [10] [100] 
Note. Authors’ calculations. 
1. The sample consists of the approximately 330 thousand individuals enrolled in SNAP in year 2000. 
2. The top figure in each cell is the number of beneficiaries, and the figure in square brackets is the 
number in each cell as a percentage of the row sum. 
3. The columns are the quintiles in 2000, and the rows are the quintiles in year 2006. 
4. Q5 is the 99
th
 percentile rather than the 100
th
, since the income distributions are right skewed. 
5. Due to rounding, the percentages reported in this table may not sum to 100. 
 
Table 2. Earnings Mobility between January 2000 and December 2013 
Quintile 
(threshold) 
$0  
Q1:  
$3,757 
Q2:  
$9,067 
Q3:  
$14,017 
Q4:  
$20,775 
Q5:  
$49,029 
Row 
Sums 
$0  
95,881 4,634 3,911 3,236 2,667 2,350 112,679 
[85] [4] [3] [3] [2] [2] [100] 
Q1:  29,382 4,445 3,314 2,427 1,898 1,580 43,046 
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$1,480 [68] [10] [8] [6] [4] [4] [100] 
Q2:  
$4,206 
25,274 4,743 4,236 3,412 2,891 2,491 43,047 
[59] [11] [10] [8] [7] [6] [100] 
Q3:  
$7,915 
22,054 4,172 4,747 4,653 4,032 3,391 43,047 
[51] [10] [11] [11] [9] [8] [100] 
Q4: $12,681 
18,596 3,503 4,600 5,911 5,752 4,685 43,047 
[43] [8] [11] [14] [13] [11] [100] 
Q5: $28,984 
16,555 2,536 3,228 4,396 6,795 9,537 43,047 
[38] [6] [8] [10] [16] [22] [100] 
Column 
Sums 
207,740 24,033 24,036 24,035 24,035 24,034 327,913 
[63] [7.3] [7.3] [7.3] [7.3] [7.3] [100] 
Note. 1. The sample consists of the approximately 3.5 million individuals enrolled in SNAP in year 2000. 
2. The top figure in each cell is the number of beneficiaries, and the figure in square brackets is the 
number in each cell as a percentage of the row sum. 
3. The columns are the quintiles in 2000, and the rows are the quintiles in year 2013. 
4. Q5 is the 99
th
 percentile rather than the 100
th
, since the income distributions are right skewed. 
5. Due to rounding, the percentages reported in this table may not sum to 100. 
 
Since there is so much information in a transition matrix, it would be tedious to try to describe all of it. 
To facilitate comparisons among alternative subsamples, we construct an index of earnings mobility, 
denoted M, as specified in equation (1) (Note 6). 
 𝑀 = 𝑘−1[∑ 100 − 𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
] (1) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑖  is the row percentage of individuals in the ith row and column (i = 1, … , k) of the mobility 
matrix. The resulting index is bounded between zero and 100, and mobility is positively related to the 
value of the index. This index of earnings mobility rests on the fact that those experiencing no earnings 
mobility are in the cells lying on the diagonal of Table 1. For example, an index equal to 20 means that 
20 percent of the sample are in a different quantile in 2006 than the one in which they started in 2000. 
While the interpretation of this index is straightforward and intuitive, it does discard information about 
earnings mobility in the off diagonal cells (Note 7). 
The mobility index (“M”) for Table 1 is approximately equal to 70. This is indicative of a relatively 
high degree of earnings mobility among all of the individuals in the sample. The mobility index for the 
nonzero-earnings submatrix of Table 1, henceforth denoted 𝑀−$0, is equal to 80 (Note 8). In other 
words, mobility among the individuals in the nonzero-earnings subsample is greater than for the sample 
as a whole (80 versus 70, respectively). The mobility index for the submatrix or cell reporting no 
earnings in either year, henceforth denoted 𝑀$0 and referred to as the “zero-earnings submatrix”, is 
equal to 21, meaning that 21 percent of the sample that begins in the $0 quantile in 2000 is no longer in 
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the $0 quantile in 2006 while 79 percent remains in the $0 quantile (Note 9). This is indicative of 
relatively little earnings mobility among this group or a high degree of stationarity. 
Table 2 is constructed with the same initial sample of 327,913 individuals. However, Table 2 compares 
the earnings categories of these individuals in year 2000 with their earnings categories in 2013. The 
mobility index (𝑀) for Table 2 is equal to 75, which is slightly greater than the corresponding value 
for Table 1. The mobility index (𝑀−$0) for the nonzero-earnings submatrix of Table 2 is 87. This value 
is also greater than the corresponding value for Table 1. Finally, the mobility index (𝑀$0) for the 
zero-earnings submatrix is equal to 15. This is somewhat smaller than the corresponding value for 
Table 1. These patterns should come as little surprise. They show, just as one would expect, that the rate 
of earnings mobility is greater over a 13-year time period than over a 6-year period, except for the $0 
earnings group. As we shall see, this pattern is repeated throughout the following analysis of earnings 
mobility for the various subsamples considered below. 
3.1 Additional Analysis 
We conducted several analyses.  
3.1.1 Subsamples 
To gain insight into SNAP enrollment duration on earnings mobility, we further partition our sample 
into three subsamples: those who drop out of SNAP prior to December 2006, the halfway point in the 
sample period; those who drop out after December 2006 but before December 2013; and those who are 
continuously enrolled in SNAP for the entire sample period. Table 3 reports the mobility indexes from 
the earnings transition matrices for these three subsamples. In addition, we report the number of 
observations in each subsample as well as the number of observations in the $0-$0 cell. For ease of 
reference, we also report the corresponding information from Table 1 and Table 2.  
 
Table 3. Summary of Income Mobility Measures for Subsamples 
Sample 
Ending 
Year 
Sample 
Size 
Percent in  
$0-$0 cell
1 
M M$0 M-$0 
Table 1 2006 327,913 27.1 70 21 80 
Table 2 2013 327,913 29.2 75 15 87 
Dropped-out prior to December 
2006 
2006 300,703 25.1 70 22 80 
2013 300,703 27.3 75 16 87 
Dropped-out between December 
2006 and December 2013 
2006 16,230 45.0 68 15 78 
2013 16,230 46.6 73 15 86 
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Enrolled for entire sample period 
2006 10,980 54.9 69 10 81 
2013 10,980 57.1 74 7 88 
1
 The figures in this column are percentages of the sample size reported in the adjacent column. The 
figures reported in brackets in the cells labelled $0-$0 in Table 2 and Table 3 are percentages of the row 
sum. 
 
The vast majority, approximately 91.7 percent, of individuals enrolled in SNAP in 2000 drop out of the 
program prior to December 2006, and only 3.3 percent of the sample are enrolled in SNAP for the 
entire 6-year period. There is a visible trend for those individuals with longer exposures to SNAP. As 
the exposure to SNAP increases, the proportion of the enrollees in the $0-$0 category increases. For 
example, the $0-$0 category makes up around 29.2 percent of the SNAP sample reported in Table 2. In 
contrast, the $0-$0 earnings category makes up approximately 57.1 percent of the sample enrolled in 
SNAP for the entire 13-year sample period (last row in Table 3). This pattern is reinforced by the 
mobility indexes reported in the column labelled 𝑀$0 in Table 3 which shows an inverse relationship 
between the probability of escaping the $0 category in 2013 and the length of SNAP exposure. Note 
that we are not suggesting that longer exposures to SNAP reduces the probability of escaping the $0 
category; in fact, one would expect the causation to run in the opposite direction. On the other hand, 
there is little difference in the values of M-$0 as the length of exposure to SNAP increases. 
There appears to be two different groups or experiences among SNAP beneficiaries. A large proportion 
of SNAP beneficiaries in the $0 category in year 2000, upwards of 80 to 90 percent, appear to be 
trapped in the $0 category. In contrast, it is evident from examining the mobility indexes reported in the 
column labelled 𝑀−$0 in Table 3 that those with nonzero earnings in 2000 enjoy considerable earnings 
mobility. This index varies between 78 and 81 over the six-year time period and 86 and 88 over the 
13-year time period. Although the value of the nonzero-earnings mobility index (𝑀−$0) increases from 
80 to 87 as the time period increases from 6 to 13 years, the value of the mobility index appears to be 
independent of the length of time the beneficiary is enrolled in the SNAP program.  
3.3.2 TANF Recipients 
We also drew a sample of low income individuals using TANF administrative records and constructed 
earnings transition matrices. The results using the TANF sample are generally consistent with those 
reported for the SNAP sample, and thus we do not report the TANF transition matrices. There are two 
differences. First, the earnings mobility indexes are slightly larger for the TANF sample, and, second, a 
smaller share of the TANF sample is in the $0-$0 category. These two differences may reflect the time 
limits on TANF benefits (Note 10). 
3.3.3 Mobility Patterns for Other Cohorts 
Thus far we only track one cohort, namely adults enrolled in SNAP in the year 2000. Further analysis is 
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required to determine whether the experience of this cohort is representative for that of other cohorts 
during the observation period of this study. Since there is only one 13-year cohort in our sample, we 
focus on the 6-year cohorts. We construct earnings transition matrices for the remaining 6-year cohorts, 
corresponding to 2001-2007, 2002-2008, … , 2007-2013. We use a test statistic devised by Trede (1999) 
to determine if the rates of earnings mobility observed for the 2000-2006 cohort is representative of the 
rates observed in the seven subsequent 6-year cohorts. We can only conduct this statistical test for the 
set of all program participants in a given year and the set of individuals enrolled consecutively for less 
than six years. As before, we exclude children and retirees from the samples. We construct transition 
matrices by selecting individuals who participated in SNAP for at least one month in the initial year of 
the 6-year period used to construct a given transition matrix.  
Trede (1999) describes a statistical method for testing differences in summary measures of transition 
matrices. Given the large number of observations in our samples, we revise the test statistic to reduce 
its sensitivity to the sample size. For cohorts 2000 to 2006 and 𝑡 to 𝑡 +  6, where t = 2001, … , 2007, 
the test statistic (denoted by S) is given by the following expression: 
S = |𝑀2000 −𝑀𝑡|/[(𝜎2000
2 ) ⁄ ∛(𝑛2000) + (𝜎𝑡
2) ⁄ ∛(𝑛𝑡)]                  (2) 
𝑀𝑡 is the value of the mobility index for the cohort beginning in year 𝑡 (= 2001 through 2007) as 
previously defined, 𝜎𝑡
2 is the variance of 𝑀𝑡 and 𝑛𝑡 is the number of observations in the cohort 
beginning in year 𝑡. With 𝑀 and 𝑛 given, we use the delta method to estimate the variance of 𝑀. 
This measure deviates from Trede’s insofar as his statistic uses the number of observations rather than 
its cube root; however, both statistics are asymptotically equivalent. We use the cube root of the 
number of observations to reduce the sensitivity of Trede’s test statistic to the sample size. 
Table 4 presents estimates of equation (Note 11). We test the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝑀2000 = 𝑀𝑡 and the 
alternative hypothesis 𝐻𝐴: 𝑀2000 ≠ 𝑀𝑡, where the subscript t refers to a 6-year cohort beginning in 
2001 through 2007. Notice that the test statistic for five of the seven cohorts are below the 95-percent 
critical value, meaning that the differences in the indexes are statistically indistinguishable from zero at 
the 5 percent significance level. Note, in particular, that this implies that earnings mobility among the 
low-earnings individuals in our sample did not change during the Great Recession.  
 
Table 4. Testing Mobility Measure for Total Enrollment of Additional Cohorts 
Cohort Sample Size (n) Variance (?̂?2) Test Statistic1 
2000-06 132,681 0.180  
2001-07 148,992 0.187 0.248 
2002-08 174,244 0.187 1.423 
2003-09 205,786 0.178 2.939 
2004-10 226,127 0.176 1.867 
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2005-11 252,140 0.176 1.884 
2006-12 243,463 0.175 2.093 
2007-13 248,312 0.182 1.231 
1
 The critical value is 1.96 at the 5-percent significance level Characteristics of the sample. 
 
An important consideration related to earnings mobility is whether mobility is different among types of 
individuals differentiated by household size, gender, and race. Some popular press and political debates 
have painted welfare recipients with a broad brush that implies individuals receiving SNAP (or TANF) 
benefits are more heavily represented by single mothers and non-Caucasians. In designing public 
policies such as SNAP, it is important to know the demographics of the recipient population. In the 
context of this paper, that means the demographics of those with and without earnings mobility. What 
do those “stuck” in the $0-$0 category look like and how do they move through the earnings 
distribution over time? Table 5 presents the characteristics of the full sample and those individuals in 
the $0-$0 earning category in Table 1 and Table 2. Table 6 shows the characteristics of those 
individuals with dependent children, i.e., a child 17 years of age or younger in 2000. Any 
head-of-household in a family in which there is a dependent child is assumed to be the “parent” of that 
dependent child. Comparing the concentration of characteristics in the overall sample (the first two data 
columns of Table 5 and Table 6) to the $0-$0 cell, we find that there is a heavier concentration of males, 
whites, and disabled individuals in the $0-$0 cells than in the overall SNAP sample. This alone 
contradicts some of the characterizations of SNAP recipients in the popular press which often 
characterizes those stuck in poverty as single black mothers. The disabled represent the vast majority of 
the observations in the $0-$0 category in Table 5 and Table 6. 
 
Table 5. Characteristics of Individuals 
 Sample $0-$0 in 2000-2006 $0-$0 in 2000-2013 
Category Total 
Percent 
of Total Total 
Percent 
of Total 
Percent of 
Category Total 
Percent 
of Total 
Percent of 
Category 
Males 86,689 26.4 31,393 35.3 36.2 33,161  34.6 38.3 
Females 241,224  73.6 57,502 64.7 23.8 62,720  65.4 26.0 
White 115,556  35.2 38,541 43.4 33.4 41,329  43.1 35.8 
Black 209,853  64.0 49,448 55.6 23.6 53,615  55.9 25.5 
Other Race/Ethnicity 2,504  0.8 905 1.0 36.1 937  1.0 37.4 
Married 50,508  15.4 15,192 17.1 30.1 16,234  16.9 32.1 
Disabled 37,757  11.5 29,604 33.3 78.4 30,580  31.9 81.0 
Married Female 27,663  8.4 8,560 9.6 30.9 9,257  9.7 33.5 
Black Single Female 153,762  46.9 30,792 34.6 20.0 33,813  35.3 22.0 
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White Single Female 58,497  17.8 17,696 19.9 30.3 19,179  20.0 32.8 
Other Race Single Female 1,302  0.4 454 0.5 34.9 471  0.5 36.2 
Married Male 22,845  7.0 6,632 7.5 29.0 6,977  7.3 30.5 
Black Single Male 40,501  12.4 14,638 16.5 36.1 15,535  16.2 38.4 
White Single Male 22,940  7.0 9,976 11.2 43.5 10,496  10.9 45.8 
Other Race Single Male 403  0.1 147 0.2 36.5 153  0.2 38.0 
Disabled Female 24,516  7.5 19,404 21.8 79.1 20,055  20.9 81.8 
Disabled Black 23,676  7.2 17,960 20.2 75.9 18,602  19.4 78.6 
Disabled White 13,864  4.2 11,465 12.9 82.7 11,794  12.3 85.1 
Disabled Other Race 217  0.1 179 0.2 82.5 184  0.2 84.8 
Disabled Male 13,241  4.0 10,200 11.5 77.0 10,525  11.0 79.5 
Disabled Married 3,538  1.1 2,832 3.2 80.0 2,927  3.1 82.7 
Disabled Single 34,219  10.4 26,772 30.1 78.2 27,653  28.8 80.8 
With Dependent Child 249,007  75.9 52,178 58.7 21.0  57,280 59.7 23.0 
TOTAL 327,913  100.0 88,895 100.0 27.1 95,881  100.0 29.2 
 
Table 6. Characteristics of Individuals with a Dependent Child 
  Sample $0-$0 in 2000-2006 $0-$0 in 2000-2013 
  Total 
Percent 
of Total Total 
Percent 
of Total 
Percent of 
Category Total 
Percent 
of Total 
Percent of 
Category 
Males 45,653 18.3 12,439 23.8 27.2 13,195 23.0 28.9 
Females 203,354 81.7 39,739 76.2 19.5 44,085 77.0 21.7 
White 88,838 35.7 23,690 45.4 26.7 25,828 45.1 29.1 
Black 158,080 63.5 27,792 53.3 17.6 30,728 53.6 19.4 
Other Race/Ethnicity 2,089 0.8 696 1.3 33.3 724 1.3 34.7 
Married 44,995 18.1 12,362 23.7 27.5 13,263 23.2 29.5 
Disabled 17,107 6.9 12,843 24.6 75.1 13,403 23.4 78.3 
Married Female 24,624 9.9 6,972 13.4 28.3 7,569 13.2 30.7 
Black Single Female 130,520 52.4 21,049 40.3 16.1 23,539 41.1 18.0 
White Single Female 47,082 18.9 11,358 21.8 24.1 12,598 22.0 26.8 
Other Race Single 
Female 
1,128 0.5 360 0.7 31.9 379 0.7 33.6 
Married Male 20,371 8.2 5,390 10.3 26.5 5,694 9.9 28.0 
Black Single Male 13,683 5.5 3,504 6.7 25.6 3,746 6.5 27.4 
White Single Male 11,375 4.6 3,485 6.7 30.6 3,693 6.4 32.5 
Other Race Single Male 224 0.1 60 0.1 26.8 62 0.1 27.7 
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Disabled Female 13,679 5.5 10,356 19.8 75.7 10,814 18.9 79.1 
Disabled Black 11,441 4.6 8,276 15.9 72.3 8,669 15.1 75.8 
Disabled White 5,556 2.2 4,478 8.6 80.6 4,643 8.1 83.6 
Disabled Other Race 110 0.0 89 0.2 80.9 91 0.2 82.7 
Disabled Male 3,428 1.4 2,487 4.8 72.5 2,589 4.5 75.5 
Disabled Married 2,374 1.0 1,833 3.5 77.2 1,908 3.3 80.4 
Disabled Single 14,733 5.9 11,010 21.1 74.7 11,495 20.1 78.0 
TOTAL 249,007 100.0 52,178 100.0 21.0 57,280 100.0 23.0 
 
3.3.4 Earnings Mobility among Single Mothers 
Given the interest in the effect of program participation on the labor supply of single mothers, we use 
these data to examine the long-run earnings mobility of single mothers. Using the SNAP and TANF 
administrative records, we identified unmarried females who are also a mother or guardian of a child. 
Summary information for this subsample is reported in Table 7. The proportion of the full sample who 
are single mothers is 39. Interestingly, single mothers are slightly underrepresented in the $0-$0 
categories relative to their shares in the SNAP and TANF samples. Comparing the values of 𝑀 and 
𝑀−$0 for single mothers with the corresponding indexes reported in Table 3, there are only slight 
differences, and there is no discernible pattern in these differences. Comparing the values of 𝑀$0 for 
single mothers with the corresponding indexes reported in Table 3, it appears that single mothers with 
zero earnings in 2000 have a greater probability, in some cases a much greater probability, of escaping 
the zero category than the general population of program participants. 
Table 8 reports tests of the hypotheses that single mothers do not experience differential earnings 
mobility with regard to both enrollment status and length of enrollment. We calculate transition 
matrices for individuals who are not single mothers and calculate the test statistic S to compare the 
mobility measures of these two subsamples. Interestingly and unexpectedly, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no differential earnings mobility at the 5-percent significance level for all statuses and 
lengths of enrollment. This suggests that the earnings mobility of single mothers is not statistically 
distinguishable at the 5-percent significance level from those who are not single mothers. This result is 
somewhat surprising given that the literature generally finds that single mothers experience worse 
economic outcomes than two-parent households [Povich, Roberts and Mather (Winter 2013-2014)]. 
 
Table 7. Summary Measures of Income Mobility among Single Mothers 
Sample 
Ending 
Year 
Sample 
Size 
Percent in 
$0-$0 cell
1 
M M$0 M-$0 
Full sample 
2006 127,654 17.7 70 29 78 
2013 127,654 19.7 74 21 85 
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Dropped-out prior to December 2006 
2006 114,345 16.0 70 30 78 
2013 114,345 18.0 75 22 85 
Dropped-out between December 2006 and 
December 2013 
2006 8,030 28.2 69 24 78 
2013 8,030 29.9 74 19 85 
Enrolled for entire sample period 
2006 5,279 38.0 70 19 80 
2013 5,279 40.9 75 12 87 
1
 The figures in this column are percentages of the sample size reported in the adjacent column. 
 
Table 8. Testing Earnings Mobility for Single Mothers against That of All Other Individuals
1 
Sample Ending Year 
Mobility 
Measure (M)
2 
Variance (?̂?2) Test Statistic1 
Full sample 
2006 71 0.182 1.215 
2013 76 0.128 1.839 
Dropped-out prior to  
December 2006 
2006 71 0.177 1.090 
2013 76 0.125 1.671 
Dropped-out between December 2006 
and December 2013 
2006 69 0.351 0.018 
2013 74 0.257 0.099 
Enrolled for entire sample period 
2006 70 0.397 0.124 
2013 75 0.270 0.101 
1
 This table presents the results of testing the null hypothesis that the earnings mobility measure for a 
given cohort of single mothers is equal to the earnings mobility measure for all other individuals who 
are not single mothers for a given cohort. 
2
 This column refers to the earnings mobility measure for all other individuals who are not single 
mothers. 
3 
The critical value is 1.96 at the 5-percent significance level. 
 
3.3.5 Recent SNAP Enrollees  
The sample used for Tables 1 and 2 consists of all SNAP recipients who were in the program in 2000, 
including those who may have been in the program for many years prior to 2000. We created an 
alternative sample that consists of individuals in the SNAP file in 2001 who were not in the file in 2000. 
This file can be thought of as “new” low income individuals. We created earnings transition matrices 
for this new sample for each of the two periods 2001-2007 and 2007-2013. The matrices are very 
similar to those for the original sample. Because they are so similar we do not report them. 
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4. Summary and conclusions 
We use administrative data to examine the earnings mobility of SNAP beneficiaries in the state of 
Georgia during the period January 2000 through December 2013. Based on the evidence reported here, 
it appears that there are two different groups or experiences in our sample. There appears to be little 
earnings mobility among individuals with zero earnings in the initial year (2000). For those individuals 
with nonzero earnings in the initial year, there appears to be substantial earnings mobility. 
Unfortunately, a substantial proportion of our sample appears to be trapped in the zero-earnings 
category over significant periods of time. We find that there is a heavier concentration first of all of 
disabled individuals than in the overall SNAP population. Other high $0-$0 categories include males 
and whites, married or not. These findings contradict some of the characterizations of SNAP recipients 
in the popular press which often characterizes those stuck in poverty as single black mothers. The 
disabled represent the vast majority of the observations in stuck in poverty or in the $0-$0 category. 
Another interesting finding is that single mothers with zero earnings in 2000 have a greater probability, 
in some cases a much greater probability, of escaping the zero earnings category than the general 
population of program participants. 
It is difficult to identify specific causes for these findings. Without additional demographic, education, 
and other information, we cannot speculate specific causes for movement among a certain set of 
recipients and the trap that others contend with. Future research will seek to identify causal 
relationships between earnings mobility and social programs. This paper is useful in identifying 
sub-populations that deserve further study and potentially dispels some preconceived notions of 
individuals who receive public benefits. In addition, the results in this paper ought to be approached 
with some caution. We are not able to account for individuals who leave the state, are institutionalized 
for one reason or another, or work in the informal sector. Furthermore, we do not have a counterfactual 
group with which to benchmark the experiences of our sample of program beneficiaries. The 
individuals in our sample may be faring better or worse in terms of long-run earnings mobility than a 
sample of otherwise identical individuals with no exposure to these programs.  
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Notes 
Note 1. There is an extensive literature on intergenerational income mobility and lifetime income 
mobility. The methodology employed in this study differs from those approaches in that we focus on 
the income mobility of individuals (families) over a given period of time. 
Note 2. The ES202 is now more commonly referred to as the Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages (QCEW). 
Note 3. We create a categorical variable for each month that indicates an individual’s enrollment status 
with regard to SNAP; this variable is extracted from the Department of Human Services datasets. An 
individual is identified by a unique identifier; however, not all the identifiers could be matched in both 
datasets. Therefore, a number of individuals are excluded from the dataset. The proportion of unmatched 
identifiers in the SNAP dataset varies between 0.5 and 4.5 percent for a given month. 
Note 4. The SNAP dataset can be used to explore trends in the usage of these two programs. We do not 
describe the enrollment trends for Georgia here because they are similar to those reported for the U.S. as 
a whole, which have been described in Loprest (2012) and Mullins et al (2015). 
Note 5. Formby et al. (2004) describe alternative ways of constructing mobility matrices. 
Note 6. Formby et al. (2004) describe alternative measures of income mobility as well as their relative 
strengths and weaknesses. 
Note 7. To make matters more concrete, consider the following hypothetical example. Suppose there is 
no earnings mobility. In this case, the percentage in each of the cells lying along the main diagonal of 
the matrix will be equal to 100, indicating that 100 percent of the individuals in a given earnings 
quantile in year 2000 are in the same earnings quantile in year 2006. The sum of these figures would 
equal 600, subtracting this sum from 600, and dividing the result by six results in a mobility index 
equal to zero, meaning that there is no earnings mobility. Taking the opposite extreme, suppose no one 
is in the same earnings quantile in year 2006 as in year 2000. In this case, the percentage in each of the 
cells along the main diagonal would be equal to zero, and the mobility index would be equal to 100, 
indicating “complete” earnings mobility. 
Note 8. The subscript is meant to indicate that the first submatrix is created by excluding the row and 
column labelled $0. 
Note 9. With a little algebra, one can easily show that 𝑀$0 = 6  𝑀 −    𝑀−$0. 
Note 10. We also considered individuals who are jointly enrolled in SNAP and TANF during any month 
in year 2000 in the State of Georgia. However, since most TANF recipients also participate in SNAP, but 
not vice versa, the transition matrix looks very similar to those in Tables 1 and 2. We do not include 
tables of these results. 
Note 11. The results of estimating equation (2) for those enrolled consecutively for less than six years are 
suppressed since they are identical in outcome to those presented in Table 6. 
 
 
